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Abstract: 1995 Turkish parliamentary election was held almost under the conditions of 
a controlled experiment.  The unique cross-section data pertaining to this election and the 
economic and political conditions surrounding it were utilized to study the relationship 
between the government’s economic performance and the vote shares of political parties. 
 Turkish voters are found to be myopic, not looking back beyond the election year in 
assessing the government’s economic performance.  A good performance is found to 
benefit the primary incumbent party at the expense of extremist opposition parties and a 
bad performance is found to benefit extremist opposition parties at the expense of the 
primary party in power.  The junior party in a coalition government and the centrist 
opposition parties appear to be unaffected by the economic conditions.  Evidence found is 
consistent with a strategic voting by the electorate, to diffuse power and/or to try parties 
and leaders that were not tried before or last tried a long time ago.  These conclusions are 
essentially in conformity with the literature on other countries. 
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A well informed electorate, which holds governments accountable for their economic 
performance, is essential to a well functioning democracy and economic system.  Of equal 
importance is whether the voters judge an administration on its entire tenure or just on its 
recent performance.  If the latter is the case, then the governments will be provided with an 
incentive to undertake populist policies before an election and deal with their adverse long-run 
effects after the election.  Also, the administrations then will be motivated to postpone, until 
after elections, the measures that are necessary for the long-run health of the economy, if their 
short-run effects include some hardships.  Thus, understanding how voters vote, is not only 
important in predicting the election outcomes but is crucial to understanding the behavior of 
policymakers and so the stability and growth of the economy.
1 
 
Consequently, a considerable amount of research has been devoted to understanding 
the voter response to economic conditions.
2  Much of this research however is concentrated on 
a few countries.  While the elections in industrialized democracies, especially those in the 
United States, are investigated extensively, studies on other countries are in short supply 
mainly, but not solely, due to lack of contested elections.  Research in this area is very limited 
even in countries like Turkey where multi-party democracy and competitive elections have a 
history exceeding half a century.  This is due to challenges posed by data related problems. 
      
Researchers studying the impact of economic events on election outcomes face three 
basic data-related problems.  First, time-series data is scarce.  They are realized at the rate of 
one observation every four years or so.  Second, elections and changes in government do not 
necessarily occur at the end of periods for which economic statistics are collected.  Third, 
variables that are typically used to represent economic performance are often autocorrelated 
and crosscorrelated. 
 
The first problem renders time-series studies in this area infeasible except for 
countries such as the United States where elections are held regularly, under the same rules 
and for centuries.  For countries like Turkey on the other hand, although history of contested 
elections is not that short, due to military interventions, party closures and frequent changes in 
election laws, consistent time-series data of sufficient length are hard to come by.  The second 
problem makes precise measurement of economic conditions corresponding to the tenure of a 
government or to the pre-election period, difficult.  This problem is exacerbated  when 
monthly or quarterly data is not available on economic variables. Consequently, it is more of 
a problem in less developed countries and in cross-section studies.  The third problem creates 
                                                            
1  Whether the politicians cause Apolitical business cycles,@ acting on such incentives however is 
beyond the scope of our study.   
2  For a survey of these studies, see Lewis-Beck (1988), Nannestad and Paldam (1994), Norpoth (1996) 
and Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000).     
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difficulties in estimating separate impacts of recent and distant economic performance and of 
different economic factors, on election results. 
 
To remedy the first problem, non-U.S. studies have often resorted  to pooling different 
types of elections involving multiple nations with different political systems, cultures and 
levels of development.  While the findings of such studies can provide us with some insights 
on the significance and direction of the impact of economic variables on election outcomes, 
their applicability to individual countries is questionable, as the magnitudes of their estimates 
vary considerably from study to study.   For a large country like Turkey which exhibits wide 
political and economic variation across its regions, a better approach to solving the first 
problem may be to use cross-provincial data for one or more elections, provided that the 
elections involved are fairly contested and are not held under the shadow of an extraordinary 
non-economic event. 
 
Since controlled experimentation is not possible in this area, the solution to the second 
and third problems require some luck in finding suitable data. In this regard, the results of the 
1995 Turkish parliamentary election, at the provincial level, provide us with a unique 
opportunity.  This election was held on December 24th, almost at the end of the calendar year 
for which statistics are collected.  The same coalition government, headed by the same prime 
minister, was in power during the election year and the year preceding it.  The election was 
fairly contested, unlike the ones in 1983, 1999 and 2002 for example, when some parties 
and/or political leaders were banned from entering the election.  In fact, the 1995 election not 
only resulted in transfer of power to a new coalition, a far-right pro-Islamist party emerged 
from it as the top vote-getter, a first in Turkish history. Also, unlike the election held in 1999, 
no major event such as the capture of the leader of the terrorist organization PKK dominated 
the voting in 1995.   Most importantly, the economic conditions in the two years preceding 
the election were quite different from each other.  The correlation coefficient between 
provincial growth rates in per capita real GDP in 1994 and 1995 is literally zero, as if the data 
were generated by a designed experiment. 
 
Our purpose in this paper is to take advantage of the unusual opportunity provided by 
the 1995 Turkish election and circumstances surrounding it, in studying the relationship 
between economic performance and election outcomes, to see whether conclusions reached 
for other democracies also hold for the Turkish case.  In particular we will investigate 
whether Turkish voters 1) take economic performance into consideration in casting their 
ballots and if so, 2) whether they place as much weight on the distant past as they do on 
recent past,  3) whether they hold major and minor parties in a governing coalition equally 
accountable, 4) whether they apportion the votes they switch to or from the incumbent parties 
due to economic performance, evenly among the opposition parties, 5) whether they vote 
strategically to provide checks and balances against concentration of power, and  6) whether 
they exhibit any bias in favor of or against a particular party or parties.   
 
There are only a few studies on economic voting in Turkey and these have addressed 
only the first of the above questions.  Most of them have relied only on descriptive statistics  
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and considered only the impact of conditions in the agricultural sector.
3  By addressing the 
rest of the questions and considering a measure of economic performance encompassing all 
sectors of the economy, we hope to fill a gap in the literature on economic voting in Turkey.  
Actually, to our knowledge, the fourth question has not been investigated even  for voters in 
other countries.  So, we hope to contribute to the literature in that area as well.   
 
 
2. THE  MODEL 
 
We base our analysis on vote equations of the following form: 
 
Vit = a + b Vit-4 + c Gt + d Gt-1 + et        i = 1,2, .........,m                                            (1) 
 
where m is the number of parties taking part in the election.  Gt is the growth rate in 
provincial real per capita GDP in the year of the election, measured in percentage points 
(henceforth referred to as the growth rate).  Growth in real output or per capita real output is 
commonly used as a measure of economic performance and is found to be the most successful 
among economic variables in explaining election outcomes in other countries.
4  Gt-1 is the 
growth rate lagged by one year and is included in the model to check whether voters look 
back beyond the  
election year.
5  Vit  represents the provincial vote share of party i in the election held in year t. 
 Vit-4  stands for the provincial vote share of the same party in the previous election held 
approximately four years earlier.  The latter variable is included to capture the inertia in the 
political system.  Our presumption is that the combined effects of other relevant factors, such 
                                                            
3  Bulutay and Yildirim (1969), Bulutay (1970), Özselçuk (1975), Çakmak (1985), Çarko lu (1997) 
are the most notable studies on economic voting in Turkey. The first two of these, and to a large extent 
the third one, based their analysis on descriptive statistics and considered only agricultural prices and 
output as determinants of electoral outcomes.  The last two utilized regression analysis and considered 
economy-wide variables as independent variables.  However, none of them sought answers to the 
questions we have posed, except the first one.   
4  For example, Chappell and Suzuki (1993), Fair (1978, 1982, 1984, 1996 and 1998), Gleisner (1992), 
and Lewis-Beck and Rice (1984) use growth in per capita real GNP as a measure of economic 
performance in studying voter behaviour.  Peltzman (1987) uses growth in per capita real income, 
instead.  Alesina, Londregan and Rosenthal (1993 and 1996), Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and 
Burdekin (1988) use growth rate in real GNP, and Chappell and Veiga (2000), Powell and Whitten 
(1993), Whitten and Palmer (1999), and Wilkin, Haller and Norpoth (1997) use growth rate in real 
GDP, for the same purpose.  
5  The reason why longer lags were not considered is that in the empirical results presented below, 
even the growth rate lagged one year turned out to have only small and statistically insignificant 
effects. Also, while the same two-party coalition was in power during the four years between the two 
elections considered, the last two years were under a different prime minister.  
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as the urbanization rate, ethnic composition, education level, income distribution and level, 
age distribution and ideological tendencies and partisan ties of  voters, can be parsimoniously 
represented by this variable.  While measuring the impact of each of these factors is of 
interest in itself, it is beyond the scope of our study.  Reliable data on many of these variables 
are not available anyway.  Our specification allows us to keep the model simple while 
avoiding the Amissing variables” problem.   et is the disturbance term and a, b, c, and d are 
the parameters to be estimated. 
 
We would expect c to be positive for incumbent parties and negative for opposition 
parties.  In other words, good economic performance should favor incumbents at the expense 
of opposition parties.  If the results obtained in other countries are any guide, d should be zero 
or at least less than c, in absolute value.  This implies a decay in voters= memories with time.  
  
The coefficient of Vit-4, b, is likely to be close to unity, demonstrating a strong 
political inertia.  However, it is expected to vary across parties.  This parameter should be 
lower than unity for incumbent parties and parties anticipated to take part in the post-election 
government, and higher than unity for opposition parties that are not given a chance to enter 
the government, if voters vote strategically to diffuse power. There are other reasons however 
for this parameter to be less than unity for incumbent parties.  Parties in power are likely to 
alienate some of their supporters with the though decisions they make while in office.  This is 
sometimes referred to as the Acost of ruling.” Also, a regression to the mean may be in effect. 
Incumbents are incumbents because they have done well in the previous election.  It is likely 
that they have received a positive shock at that time.  In the current election, their shock is 
likely to be average (zero) rather than favorable, implying that their vote will decrease.       
 
The constant terms are in the equation to capture any bias that may exist in favor or 
against any of the parties. 
 
 
                                
3.  THE DATA AND BACKGROUND 
 
   Turkey is a parliamentary democracy.  Its election system is based on proportional 
representation.  There are 550 seats in the parliament since the 1995 election.  This figure was 
450 during the 1983, 1987 and 1991 elections.  The seats are filled through elections that take 
place in multi-member constituencies.
6  The president is elected by the parliament who in turn 
appoints the prime minister.  The prime minister and the cabinet he or she heads, takes office 
only after receiving a vote of confidence from the parliament. 
 
To fit our model, we have chosen the results of the 1991 and 1995 parliamentary 
                                                            
6  Usually each province constitutes a constituency.  However, a few populous provinces are divided 
into several constituencies.     
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elections in Turkey.  The former enter the equations as an independent variable and the latter 
as the dependent variable.  The source of data for the vote shares of political parties are 
Tuncer (1996) and State Institute of Statistics (1998).   
 
Major political parties which participated in the 1991 and 1995 elections and their 
vote shares in the nationwide totals are presented in Table 1.  Henceforth, we will refer to 
these parties by their Turkish acronyms which are also given in the table. These parties 
include all of those that exceeded in 1995 the nationwide 10% threshold necessary to be 
represented in the parliament, plus MHP which came close to it and HADEP which, while 
falling quite below the threshold, ranked first in five provinces. Tuncer (1996) reports that 
MHP would have won 32 of the 550 seats in the parliament, and HADEP, 24 of them, if the 
nationwide threshold did not apply.  The inclusion of the latter two parties in our analysis was 




   Of the parties in the table, DYP and ANAP represent, ideologically, the center-right, 
CHP and DSP, the center-left, and MHP and RP, the far-right.  Whereas MHP is Turkish- 
nationalist, RP which was closed in 1998 by the constitutional court for violating the 
secularism clause of the constitution, is believed to represent political Islam.  HADEP has a 
leftist ideology and is considered to be Kurdish-nationalist.  It is a regional party and receives 
its votes predominantly from ethnic Kurds living in some of the the less-developed   
Southeastern and Eastern provinces.  Its support in the West however, where most of the 
Kurds are believed to live now, is much less.   CHP, MHP and HADEP, which did not exist at 
the time of the 1991 elections, are generally considered to be continuation of People=s Social 
Democracy Party (SHP), Nationalist Work Party (MÇP) and People=s Labor Party (HEP) 
respectively, which existed then.  SHP joined CHP after the reopening of the latter in 1995. 
CHP was closed shortly after the 1980 coup-detat. We have treated the votes cast for SHP in 
1991 as if they were cast for CHP.  MÇP changed its name officially to MHP after the 1991 
elections.  HEP was closed by the Constitutional Court in 1993 on grounds that it had 
advocated secession of a portion of the country.  It reemerged later as HADEP which ended 
up being banned by the Constitutional Court as well in 2003 on the same grounds as HEP.    
 
Between the 1991 and 1995 elections a DYP-CHP (earlier, DYP-SHP) coalition 
government was in power, with DYP as the major partner.  In 1993, following the election of 
DYP leader Süleyman Demirel as president, prime ministership passed to the new leader of 
the party, Tansu Çiller. 
 
MHP (then, MÇP) entered the 1991 election in partnership with RP and under the 
banner of the latter.  Thus the votes cast for RP in 1991 should be thought of as the sum of the 
                                                            
7  While Turkish law does not allow two or more parties  to enter elections in partnership, it occurs in 
practice. Usually, the largest of the partner parties enters the election officially and nominates an 
agreed upon number of other party=s candidates as its own.  The latter rejoin their party after the 
election.   
  8 
votes for the two parties.  Likewise,  CHP (then, SHP) and HADEP (then, HEP)  entered the 
1991 elections in partnership as well, under the banner of the former.  Consequently, vote 
share of CHP (then, SHP) in 1991 is really the sum of the vote shares of the two parties in 
question.  
 
There are a number of reasons why we chose the 1991 and 1995 election data to fit 
our model.  The fact that both elections were fairly contested and were not surrounded by any 
extraordinary events, played an important role in our choice. These elections were the third 
and fourth parliamentary elections since the return to democracy following the 1980 military 
take-over and the fifth and seventh elections since that time if the local elections, which are 
held simultaneously in Turkey, are counted as well.  As a sign of their fairness, in both 1991 
and 1995 elections, incumbent parties have lost substantial amount of votes, and in each one, 
an opposition party emerged as the top vote-getter. In the case of the 1995 election, a far-right 
religious-oriented party came first which was an unprecedented occurrence in Turkish history. 
 Furthermore, in the 1991 and 1995 elections, unlike the ones in 1983, 1999 and 2002 for 
example, no political leaders or parties were banned.  Unlike the 1999 election, no major 
event such as the capture by government of long-sought Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of 
terrorist organization PKK, dominated the voting. 
 
Another factor influencing our choice of the sample was the great variation exhibited 
by vote shares across provinces, parties, and elections.  The same holds true also for growth 
rates.  The latter, computed from the provincial per capita real GDP figures reported by the 
State Planning Organization (2002), vary considerably not only between the provinces but 
also between the two years preceding the 1995 election.  1994 was a recession year. As a 
matter of fact, in that year, the Turkish economy experienced its severest contraction to date 
since 1945, with a 6.1 percent reduction in GNP and 7.1 percent drop in real per capita GDP.
8 
 In 1994, two-thirds of the provinces had negative growth rates.  In contrast, real GNP and 
real per capita GDP grew at rates of  8 percent and 5.3 percent respectively in 1995, when less 
than one-fifth of the provinces experienced negative growth rates.  The correlation coefficient 
between provincial growth rates in 1994 and 1995 is literally zero.  Also, since the 1995 
election was held on December 24th, the growth rates reported for 1995 and 1994 correspond 
almost exactly to the two years preceding the election. Thus the sample gives us a unique 
opportunity to measure independent effects of economic performance during the election year 
and during the one preceding it. 
 
Some minor rearrangement of the data was needed due to changes in the 
administrative division of the country between 1991 and 1995.  At the time of the 1991 
elections the country was divided into 74 provinces.  However one of these was partioned into 
three in the following year and three of them into two shortly before the 1995 election. 
Because the 1993-1995 GDP data are not available for the provinces created in 1995 but they 
                                                            
8  Since then similar and worse recessions occurred in 1999 and 2001 when real GNP dropped 6.1 
percent and  9.4 percent respectively (State Institute of Statistics, 2002).  
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are for the original provinces from which these emerged, we recomposed the latter and 
pretended as if the 1995 election took place in 76 provinces instead of 79.
9   Since the 
necessary GDP and vote share data exist for the parts of the province partioned in 1992, we 
disaggregated the vote data for the province and acted as if  the 1991 election was also held n 
the 76 provinces we had assumed for 1995.
10  
 
Lack of separate vote data in 1991 for RP and MHP which entered the election  in 
partnership, forced us to aggregate their votes in 1995 as well and treat them as if they were 
one party which we denoted as RP+MHP.  However, treating CHP and HADEP (earlier, SHP 
and HEP) which also formed a partnership in 1991, in a similar manner, would defeat the 
purpose of our study, as CHP was an incumbent party and HADEP, an opposition party in 
1995.  Consequently, we were forced to use the vote share of SHP in 1991 as a proxy for Vit-4  
for both parties in question.  Of course, this would make CHP appear to have lost votes 
between 1991 and 1995 in provinces with significant HADEP presence.  As most of these are 
also the ones where growth rates were negative or low in 1994 and 1995, this approach would 
bias the results in favor of finding a strong positive relationship between economic 
performance and vote share of CHP.   Also, as some HADEP (HEP) voters may have not 
voted or voted for other parties in 1991, this approach may effect the estimation of vote 
equations for other parties as well.  To remedy the situation, we have estimated the equations 
also using a  subsample which excluded 14 provinces in which HADEP received more than 8 
percent of the vote in 1995.
11  Of these, nine had negative growth rates in 1995.  In contrast, 
only five out of remaining 62 provinces had negative growth rates in the same year.  The 
corresponding figures were 9 out of 14 and 41 out of 62 in 1994.  The subsample excludes 7 
out of  8 provinces in the Southeast and 7 out of 14 provinces in the East.
12 The descriptive 
                                                            
9  We recomposed Karabük and Zonguldak, Yalova and  İstanbul, and Kilis and Gaziantep. 
10  We partioned Kars into Kars, Ardahan and Iğdır. 
11  Eight percent is about twice the national vote share of HADEP in the 1995 election.   
 
12   The fourteen provinces eliminated from the full sample according to this criterion are the following: 
Adıyaman, Ağrı, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli,  Şanlıurfa, Van, Batman, 
Şırnak and Iğdır.  
  10 
statistics for the full sample and its subsample are given in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.  
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
 
   We have estimated the six equations represented by (1) in two ways: individually, 
using the method of Ordinary Least Squares and as a system of “Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression” equations.  The latter approach usually yields more efficient estimates.   
However, it also has the disadvantage of contaminating the estimation results of other 
equations when some of them are misspecified.  This is the case here as the lagged vote share 
variable used in CHP and HADEP equations are just proxies. The results obtained under the 
two methods were very similar though, and for brevity, we have presented in Tables 4 and 5, 
only the former.  For the reasons given in the previous section, parameter estimates in Table 
5, should be considered more reliable than the ones is Table 4. Although we have  presented 
here both tables for the sake of completeness, we will base our conclusions on Table 5.  
 
All equations fit the full sample reasonably well, except the one for CHP.  The R5 for 
CHP regression improves substantially, as we had suspected, when the provinces with large 
HADEP vote shares are eliminated from the sample. For that matter, fits of the DYP and 
ANAP equations also improve while those of DSP and RP+MHP does not worsen, from a 
switch to the smaller sample.  The fit of the HADEP equation of course worsens when 
provinces with substantial HADEP votes are eliminated from the sample.  
 
The coefficient of Gt is estimated to be positive and significant for DYP, the major 
incumbent party, in both samples.  The estimated coefficient of Gt-1 for this party however is 
only marginally significant and substantially smaller.  Thus, the evidence supports the view 
that Turkish voters take economic performance into account in casting their ballots but that 
they place more weight on recent past than on distant past.  For each percentage point 
increase in the election year growth rate, the primary  incumbent party is expected to receive 
an additional 0.36 percent of the total vote.  On the other hand, the estimated coefficients of 
Gt and Gt-1 for CHP, the junior partner in the coalition, are insignificant regardless of the 
sample used.  Therefore, it appears that it is the primary incumbent party that voters hold 
responsible for economic performance.  The estimated parameter of the growth rate is 
negative and significant only for HADEP in the full sample and only for HADEP and 
RP+MHP in the subsample. Thus, it seems that it is the extremist opposition parties that 
benefit from a poor performance by the government.  The government=s performance does 
not appear to impact the vote shares of the opposition parties in the center.  The estimated 
parameter of the lagged growth rate turns out to be insignificant also for all opposition parties, 
confirming once more that the voters are myopic in assessing economic performance.  For 
that reason we have reestimated and presented in Tables 4 and 5, the equations (1) after  
  11 
dropping the lagged growth rate variable.  
 
Our finding that a government=s economic performance more than a year before the 
election does not matter in the election=s outcome, is in conformity with the findings of  Fair 
(1978, 1982, 1984, 1996 and 1998) who studied this issue in U.S. presidential elections 
extensively.  He concluded that the growth rate only during 2-3 quarters preceding the 
election matters in incumbent party=s vote share.
13  In fact, studies that use the growth rate in 
output or in per capita output during the election year as the main economic determinant of 
the incumbent government=s electoral success, either finding or assuming growth in earlier 
years to be irrelevant, abound in the literature.  Besides Fair (1978. 1982, 1984, 1996, and 
1998), these include time-series studies by Lewis-Beck and Rice (1984), Burdekin (1988), 
Gleisner (1992), Chappell and Suzuki (1993), Alesina, Londregan and Rosenthal (1993, 
1996), and Lewis-Beck and Tien (1996) on U.S. presidential elections, by Kramer (1971), and 
Grier and McGarrity (2002) on U.S. congressional elections,
14 by Lewis-Beck (1997) on 
French presidential elections, by Çarko lu (1997) on Turkish parliamentary and local 
elections, pooled cross-section time-series studies by Powell and Whitten (1993) on 102 
parliamentary elections in 19 industrialized countries, Pacek and Radcliff (1995) on 52 
presidential elections in 8 developing countries,  Wilkin, Haller and Norpoth (1997) on 38 
parliamentary and presidential elections in 38 developed and developing countries, and 
Chappell and Veiga (2000) on 136 parliamentary elections in 13 Western European countries. 
 In other words, the answers we obtained for the first two questions listed in the Introduction 
exhibit great conformity with the literature on other countries.   
 
However, the estimates obtained by the studies cited above, the vote gain by the 
incumbent government due to  a percentage increase in the election year growth rate, ranges 
from 1.0 to 1.8 percent of the total vote, when the growth rate is measured as the percentage 
change in real GDP or real GNP, and ranges from 0.2 to 1.4 percent, when the growth rate is 
measured as the percentage change in per capita real GDP or per capita real GNP.  Our 
coefficient estimate of 0.36 is in the lower end of  this spectrum but it is almost the same as 
the estimate of 0.35 obtained by Çarko lu (1997) using time-series data concerning 21 
                                                            
13  Due to lack of quarterly GDP data at the provincial level, we were unable to measure voter=s 
memories as precisely as Fair. 
14  Although the two studies cited on U.S. congressional elections found significant effects for growth 
rate on House of Representative elections, Erikson (1988), Alesina and Rosenthal (1989, 1995), 
Alesina, Londregan and Rosenthal (1993), Chappell and Suzuki (1993), and Lynch (2002) have found 
insignificant coefficients for growth rate in their models for House elections.  Radcliff (1988) and 
Lynch (2002) have argued that the influence of macroeconomy on House elections has fallen over 
time, especially after 1913, to the point of being non-existent now.  Grier and McGarritty (2002) 
however showed that once the advantage to incumbent congressmen rerunning for office is controlled, 
growth in per capita  real income exhibits a strong influence on the outcome of House elections, even 
after 1916.     
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parliamentary and local elections in Turkey covering the 1950-1995 period.
15  In making a 
comparison with  the studies in other countries, one has to take into consideration the fact that 
in the Turkish case the vote shares of parties are smaller.  For example, according to our 
model, if the election was held at the end of 1994, when the growth rate was -7.1 percent, 
instead of at the end of 1995, when the growth rate was 5.3 percent, DYP=s vote share would 
have been 4.46 percentage points less.  That corresponds to a 23.3 percent reduction in the 
party=s vote share.        
 
Our other main finding, namely that voters distinguish between major and minor 
parties in a governing coalition and hold only the primary incumbent party accountable for 
economic performance, is also supported by the few studies that examined this issue on other 
countries.  Wilkin, Haller and Norpoth (1997) who analyzed 38 presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 38 developed and developing countries, and Tucker (2001) who 
analyzed data from 10 post-communist parliamentary elections in 5 Eastern European 
countries, have reached  the same conclusion we have in this regard.       
 
                                                            
15  However, our estimate is statistically significant whereas his was not.   
The estimated coefficient of the Vit-4 is found in both samples to be significant for all 
of the parties.  The coefficient is estimated to be below unity for both incumbent parties as 
expected.  Holding other factors constant, in four years time, these parties are anticipated to 
lose 36 to 43 percent of their previous vote share. This translates to about 9-10 percent of the 
total vote per party or 19 percent for both incumbents.  For ANAP,  the party which was in 
power from 1983 to 1991, the estimated cofficient of lagged vote share variable is also less 
than unity but not as low as the incumbent parties.  In interpreting this coefficient for 
HADEP, one should realize that the lagged vote share variable used in that case includes not 
only HADEP=s but also CHP=s vote share in 1991.  Thus it is not surprising and it should not 
be attached any significance that this coefficient is estimated to be less than unity in the 
HADEP equation.  For DSP and RP+MHP, which were given little chance of being 
successful in the election, this parameter is estimated to be above unity.  This is consistent 
with a strategic voting on the part of some voters to diffuse power.  However this finding, 
combined with the less than unity estimate obtained for ANAP, can also be attributed to a 
desire by the voters to try new parties or retry leaders that have not been tried in a while. In 
1995 the leaders of DSP, RP and MHP were all out of power for at least 15 years. This view 
is also supported by the fact that in each of the last four elections in Turkey (in 1991, 1995, 
1999 and 2002), a party never tried before, with a leader out of government at least since 
1980, has emerged as  the top vote-getter. 
 
An erosion in the votes of incumbent parties is not unique to Turkey but well-
established in the literature.  The magnitude and speed of the erosion however varies from 
study to study.  Controlling for other variables, Alesina and Rosenthal (1989, 1995), and 
Alesina, Londregan and Rosenthal (1993) estimated that the incumbent party=s U.S. House   
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vote decreases by 5 percent between a midterm and an on-year election, and by 14 percent 
between an on-year and a midterm election.  A bigger drop in the latter case is attributed by 
these authors to strategic voting by the electorate in an attempt to establish better checks and 
balances against the administration in power. In either case however, the vote losses 
estimated are much smaller than what we have found for Turkey, even after considering the 
fact that elections are seperated by two years in the U.S. case and by four years in the Turkish 
case.  On the other hand, the same studies  found that a 36 percent reduction occurs in the 
incumbent party=s presidential vote share relative to the party=s vote share in the previous 
House election.  Lynch (2002) found a drop of 28 to 41 percent, depending on the period 
examined, in the incumbent party=s midterm House election vote share relative the party=s 
previous presidential vote share. The latter findings indicate about the same amount of vote 
erosion in two years time as that occurs in Turkey over a four year period.  Whitten and 
Palmer (1999), analyzing a pooled data involving 142 elections in 19 industrialized 
democracies, measured the vote loss of incumbent parties between two elections to be 47 
percent when the clarity of government=s responsibility is high, 25 percent when it is mixed 
and only 11 percent when it is low.  Chappell and Veiga (2000), studied a pooled data 
involving 136 parliamentary elections in 13 Western European countries and found the vote 
loss by incumbent parties between elections to be typically about 30 percent.  These estimates 
are not too different than ours.  Another study which obtained a comparable result to ours is a 
cross-section study by Çakmak (1985) on Turkish 1957 parliamentary election.  In an 
equation similar to ours but one involving performance indicators for the agricultural sector 
rather than for the whole economy, he estimated  the incumbent party=s  vote loss between 
that and the previous election (held about 3.5 years earlier) to be 43 percent.
16          
 
We are unable to compare our findings concerning how the votes lost by incumbent 
parties,  due to their economic performance and through typical vote erosion, are distributed 
among the various opposition parties, as this question has not been addressed in the literature, 
   
If we ignore the unreliable CHP regression fitted to the full sample, the estimate of the 
constant term is significant only for RP+MHP, in either sample, pointing to a voter bias in 
favor of  these parties in 1995.  In addition to multiplying their previous vote share by 1.1, 
these parties appear to have captured an additional 13 percent of  the vote. This may have 
been viewed as a precursor of future election surprises.  Indeed MHP surprised everyone in 
the 1999 election by emerging as the number two party, raising its vote share from 8.18 
percent to 17.98 percent.  Another right-wing party, Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
which has roots in RP, created yet another surprise in 2002 election, by coming first with a 
vote share of 34.28 percent, highest any party has received since 1987. 




                                                            
16  Çakmak (1985) however has treated his finding as a special case rather than part of a typical 
pattern.  
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our statistical analysis of the 1995 Turkish election results and the economic and 
political conditions surrounding it, leads us to conclude that 1) Turkish voters take changes in 
economic conditions into consideration in casting their ballots.  However, 2) they seem to not 
look back beyond the election year in making their assessments and 3) they seem to hold only 
the primary party in a coalition government responsible for their economic well-being.  4) 
Only the extremist opposition parties appear to benefit from a poor performance by the 
government and suffer from a good one.  The evidence also supports the view that 5) at least a 
part of the electorate vote strategically in favor of parties and leaders that have not shared in 
the power in the recent past and/or not likely to share in it in the future. 6) There appears to be 
some bias in favor of extreme right parties on the part of the electorate. 
 
Although the above conclusions need to be replicated in studies on other Turkish elections 
before they can gain full credibility, they are essentially in conformity with the findings of  
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Table 1 
 
Vote Shares of Political Parties in Turkey (%) 








































































  8.18 
 
 








  4.17 
 
 





  0.58 
 
 
  2.09 
 
(*)  Vote share of Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP), which merged in 1995 with 
CHP following the recreation of the latter party. 
(**)   MHP, then named Nationalist Work Party (MÇP), entered the election under the 
banner of RP. 
(***)  The predecessor party to HADEP, People=s Labor Party (HEP) entered the election 
under the banner of SHP. 
Source: Tuncer (1996).  








Descriptive Statistics:  Full Sample (76 Provinces) 
   
Variable 
 




















  DYP      19.40     6.77      8.15     40.35 
  CHP        9.71     5.26      1.74     26.73 
  ANAP      19.88     6.83      5.46     54.47 
  DSP      11.51     8.78      1.04     33.69 
  RP+MHP      31.11   12.24      8.14     56.98 
  HADEP        6.26   10.55      0.62     54.21 
 
Vit-4 (1991): 
    
  DYP      26.89     8.93      3.43     62.61 
  CHP (*)      22.48   11.59      4.97     61.23 
  ANAP      23.51     6.30    10.72     47.55 
  DSP        8.43     6.18      0.91     25.35 
  RP+MHP      17.92     9.92      2.54     40.55 

























     -2.67 
   




   27.48 
 
 
(*)  Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) Vote Share. 
 











Descriptive Statistics:  Sample including only Provinces  
with less than 8% HADEP Vote Share  (62 Provinces) 
   
Variable 
 









Vote Shares  
 









  DYP     20.02     6.88      8.15     40.35 
  CHP     10.54     4.80      3.31     26.73 
  ANAP     19.71     7.00      9.91     54.47 
  DSP     13.39     8.56      1.04     33.69 
  RP+MHP     32.17   12.42      9.11     56.98 
  HADEP       2.09   10.55      0.62       7.87 
 
Vit-4  (1991): 
    
  DYP     28.27     8.93      6.57     62.61 
  CHP (*)     19.12   11.59      4.97     35.27 
  ANAP     23.86     6.30    12.15     47.55 
  DSP       9.85     6.18      1.30     25.35 
  RP+MHP     18.48     9.92      3.74     40.55 

























   -2.13 
   




   27.48 
 
(*)  Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) Vote Share. 
 
Source : Authors= computations.   
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Table 4 






 Const.  
      
 
   Vit-4 
 
   Gt 
 
  Gt-1 
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   0.511 
  (8.341) 
 
   0.511 











































   0.140 
  (2.763) 
 
   0.138 
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   0.704 
  (7.401) 
 
   0.709 








































   1.256 
(16.217) 
 




























RP + MHP 
 
 









   1.150 
(20.002) 
 






































   0.487 
  (5.926) 
 
   0.489 




























(*)  Dependent variable is Vit . For CHP and HADEP, Vit-4  is the SHP vote share in            
  1991election.  In parenthesis are the t-statistics in absolute value. 
Source: Authors’computations.  
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Table 5 
 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation Results:  Sample Including only Provinces 
with less than 8 Percent HADEP Vote Share (62 Provinces) (*) 




 Const.  
      
 
    Vit-4 
 
   Gt 
 
   Gt-1 
 
   R
2 
 
    
 
 
    F 






  0.217 
 (0.123) 
 
  0.360 
 (0.200) 
 
   0.650 
(11.195) 
 






































  0.153 
 (0.137) 
 
  0.086 
 (0.078) 
 
    0.568 
 (10.811) 
 








































   0.924 
  (9.201) 
 
   0.934 





































  0.310 
 (0.302) 
 
   1.268 
(14.310) 
 




























RP + MHP 
 
 









   1.106 
(19.046) 
 
































  0.615 
 (0.896) 
 
  0.706 
 (1.041) 
 
   0.105 
  (3.263) 
 
   0.102  
























   4.94 
 
 
   7.02 
(*)  Dependent variable is Vit . For CHP and HADEP, Vit-4  is the SHP vote share in  
       1991 election.  In parenthesis are the t-statistics in absolute value.  
Source: Authors’ omputations. 